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Universidade de São Paulo
Indexation: Optimality Conditions
for Revenuefrom Inflation and
Social Gain
Inflation has always been an appealing method offinancing flows of
government expenditures in excess of currentreceipts (explicit taxes plus
the net increase in government bonds outstanding).Thatis,inflation
represents an additional form of taxation,which, among other effects,
imposes well-known welfare losses. Indexationof a part of the money
supply (on the assumption that iridexation of currencyand demand de-
posits is not feasible or not desirable) is frequentlyrecommended as one
way to eliminate these losses. Thisproposition usually appears in the
context of discussing general indexatiori fromthe standpoint of its effects
on equity and/or stability. However,indexation is usually restricted to
subsets of markets where the manifestations ofinflation are particularly
visible. Therefore, an alternative line of research mightbe fruitful, entailing
an analysis of the actual effects of indexationwhen applied to only a
particular set of markets while other, related activities are notindexed.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the conditionsunder which full
indexation of time deposits and other money will beoptimal from (1) the
point of view of maximizing government revenue frominflation and (2) the
social point of view, given a steady and perfectlyanticipated rate of
inflation. Thi5 discussion covers neither the indexationof other financial
assets, such as treasury hills, which do not possesscharacteristics of money
NOTE: A first version of this paper was presented at the IPE.NBER Seminar on
indexation held in So
Paulo, Brazil, in February 1 975. I am indebted to Alexander Swoboda, Arnold Harberger,
Larry Sjaasad,
and Daniel Wiseca,er, as well as the members o the EonnmiC Th
Workshop. tot comments ()fl the
first tlraof the paper.
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to a significant degree, nor the case of a growing economy, althoughthe
latter can easily be incorporated througha simple extension ul ll)e results
in this paper.
The argument is developed as follows. Firstwe review the mechanism of
adjustment to an exogenous change in the growthrate of nominal cash
balances (p). Then we attenipt to determine how thegovernment should
set this rate in order to maximize revenue, and how therate must be
changed if indexation oI money other thancurrency is allowed. The last
section discusses the optimum rate of indexation fromthe social point of
view.
Here are the main conclusions. In general, full indexationof a money
does not lead to the social optimum.1 Indexationinduces increased holding
of the indexed money anda reduction in nonindexed moneys. Holdingsof
money are characterized by a divergence betweenprivate and social costs;
with downward sloping demand schedules,the social gain from indexation
shows decreasing returns for eachpercentage point increase in the rateof
indexation. The social gain will bemaximized atapositive rate of
indexation smaller than the expectedrate of inflation. Full indexation ofa
money will be socially optimal only in theparticular case where the partial
elasticities of substitution between indexedand nonindexed moneys tend
toward zero.
The government collects inflationaryrevenue from issuing currency.
When a component ofmoney is indexed the optimum rate ofinflation (from the point of view ofgovernment revenue only) necessarily falls. But
general policyimplications cannot be derived fromthisstatement.
Maximization of revenue entailspolitical risks since sucha policy may
lead to hyperinflation Withthe usual practice of inflatingat less than the
revenuemaximizjtig rate, the introduction ofindexation increases the rate of inflation requiredto produce a given (belowmaximum) revenue. A
consistent government, therefore,will only aflow indexationof a substitute
for currency along witha stabilization program in which totalrevenue from the inflation tax is plannedto fall.
III GOVERNMENT REVENUEFROM INFlATION









110 where M is nominal cash balances, P the priceleveL C, thenominal stock Its currency. rn, MiP, CiM p MIMir, PIP, and a clotOVer a variable denotes a time derivative.
of Writing (1) as
sh R1 = cprn1 = cm, + cn-,
Id
he emphasizes the nature of the adjustmentprocess An increasein the growth
St rate of nominal balances from Po top' induces a stock adjustrne
and a of flow adjustment. Given a higher expectedrate of inflation,2people wifl want to hold a smaller stock of real moneybalances. Moneyholders can restore equilibrium by moving Out of moneyand into goods.The excess g demand for goods raises the price level andreduces real balancesuntil tI'e of yields on money and other assets are equalagain, or, alternatively,until 5; the marginal utility of holding money andgoods are againequal, ata n higher rate of inflation.
If only time deposits are indexed,an increase in theexpected rate of II inflation will increase the relativeattractiveness of timedepositsvis-vis a nonindexed moneys. People will shiftfroni thesemoneys into time deposits up to the point where the marginal utilityo holding the latterequals the d marginal utility of holding the formerAfter all intrarnoneyadjustments, substitution between nioney arid800(15 will raise theprice level as de- scribed before.
n People will also adjust their flowdemand for noniinalbalances upona change in the expectedrate of inflation. In orderto nlaintairi thenew t. desired stock of real nioneybalances, peoplemust add to them nomin,l
y balances at a rate of Alper unit of time. Thisamounts to a decrease in real
disposable income of theprivate sector (after theinflation tax) and turns out to be equal to the I)roceedsof the inflationtax collected by the money-issuing institutions,
liii oprIMAuTy FROMTHE STANDPOINT OFGOVERNMENT
We assume the stockof nonmonetarywea Rh and the rate of return Oil tlliS
stock to be given inour stationary economy. DefiningT and 1) as time and
demand deposits,a total demand formoney can be derived, through the
Solution to thesystem
(2jC/P = f(y,T, MIP)
()(--j (+)
(3)DIP= gtw, 1T MIP)
H) (-) (+)TIP = h(7T, 1T' M/P)
() (+) (±)
M/P=C1P+DIP+T/P
yielding an equation of the form
MIP = m(7r, i7
() (+)
Assume also that the prohibition of interest paymentson demand deposits
is effective and completely enforced. Under these conditions,the ratio of
currency to total money held is a decreasing function of the rate ofreturn
on time deposits alone.
We are now able to turn to the discussion of the optimalrate of inflation
from the point of view of governmentrevenue. In the absence of indexa.
tion, and for a given rate of interest on time deposits, the effect ofa change
in the rate of monetary growthcan he deconiposed into two parts:
cm + cp )= cm + Cpm'
dp= c(rn + pm')
The first term on the right-hand sideof (6) shows the change inrevenue
stemming from the change in therate of the tax (p), given the tax base
(cm). The second term shows the changein revenue due to the adjustment
of the tax base to the changein the tax rate. The first term is always
positive, while the secondisprogressively negative with therate of
monetary growth. R, therefore, hasa maximum for
cpm' + cm = 0
where the maximumrevenue rate is given by
!L> o
rn
With nominal balancesgrowing at a rate of p, thegovernment is able to
maintain a steady deficit of
G =Jcp*m(p*)j=
can be interpreted as (1) the maxiniurnsustainable proceeds of the
inflation tax, (2) the flow ofrents accruing to thegovernment and stemming
from its monopoly ofcurrency issue, or (3) the flow ofseigniorage profits
collected by thegovernment froni the steady debasing ofnominal currency issued.
G will no longer be themaximum sustainable deficitwith indexation of



















ConiJr. indexati0Opti mality Conditions
c becomesdependent on the rate of inflation. Therefore,
dcdy dm
dR d{pc(y)rn} = dp
+----
+ cm




Sits Note that forO = 0 (noindexation), p = - rn/rn' = pt as before. For 0> 0
of rn
urn - m' +(rncO)/c>
ion Therefore, fJ, <p* and the revenue-maximizing rate of inflation is lower
xa- under indexation. Notice, however,that after indexation the actual rate of
rige inflation will he lower onlywhere the government was previously expand-
ing the monetary base at a rateof p*. The opposite will necessarily occur if
the government was inflating at a rateof Po < p* prior to the introduction
of indexation and it had a target revenuebelow the maximum revenue. To
keep revenue constant underconditions of indexation, the government will
ue have to increase the rate of monetarygrowth to compensate for the
ase reduction in the real value ofthe proceeds of the inflationary tax. Thus,
ent there is a possibility of more inflationunder indexation, since the discipline
ays of the loss of revenue cannot beiniposed on the government.
of
[1111 THE SOCIAL OPTIMUM
The government deficit Gis not optima! from the social pointof view. The
private cost of holding money, IT + r,exceeds the social marginal cost of
producing money, which is negligible. Thisinduces a below-optimum
desired stock of real money balances and causes awelfare loss.
The welfare loss stems from the substitutionof real resources for money
in effecting transactions. That is, to produce aflow of monetary services
with a suboptimal stock of real balances requires a moreintensive use of
real resources, and this entails a positive opportunitycost. The source of
the loss is the foregone income which is equal tothe marginal product of
these resources.
Treating the rate of inflation as a tax on real moneybalances allows us
the use of standard public finance tools to findthe optima! social rateof
indexation of time deposits. We include thereal rate of interest as a
component of the opportunity costof holding money and, tofiiid the










Currency and demand deposit holdingsare taxed at a rate of+ I per
unit of time. Indexatiol) makes therate of tax on time deposits equalto+ r--y, where y, as before, is the rate of indexation oftime depositsDeujrie + rT. and+ r- yT. For a given expectedrate of inhlat,o, Tkis constant and T varies at thesame rate as y. A change in lchanges welfare by
(7)LsWr=J1T-J_cJT + + Tj=l'kaT, (, (
where T, D, and C retain theirprevious meaning. The first termon tlìe right hand side of (7) shows thechange in welfare dueto the introduction of
indexation (measured under thedemand curve for tinie deposits),while the second shows the change inwelfare due to shifts in theschedules for demand deposits andcurrency which occur because indexationreduces the cost of holding timedeposits. Underlying theuse of this nleasure of
social welfare change is theconvention proposed by Fiarberger.4A change dT causes changes in theequilibrium level of activityXk. When demand price and marginalcost diverge in Xk by theamount of Tk, each successive
change dXk entailsa social gain equal to Tk dXk.The summatior) ofall successive changes dXk givesthe total contributionof the change in welfare in activity k to thetotal welfare change LW.On the other hand, for all related activitieswhere demand priceand marginal costare equal, any change dXx. producesno net contribution to
Let us return toexpression (7). It can besimplified if weassume linear
money-demand schedules whichsatisfy the summingcondition. Under this specification the change inwelfare is given by
= - (1/2) (T- Tk)1a + T (TTk)a + Tk (T-
























re which is necessarilysmaller than iT + r since f3 and a have opposite signs.
Expression (7) admits two limiting cases. For= ü the optinium rate of
indexatiOn is equal tothe opportunity cost of holding time deposits. In the
case of f3 =al, the optirnuni policy is no indexation at all, since in this
case themarginal losses and gains for a minute change in indexation are
equal.
A neat interpretation canbe given to expression (7). Noting that
aM/aT
aT/aT, TM
(AT)y(J'Vfl(iT + r) = (T ±L) +C)- + r)
and
(8)T(7r+r_y*)(D+C)(iT+r)
The term on the left-hand side of (8) shows the marginal gain from one
percentage point of indexation, whilethe right-hand side of (8) shows the
marginal loss. The social welfare optimum requires that rate of indexation
at which marginal gainsand losses balance. Figure 1depicts this proposi-
tion. For simplicity we only draw diagrams tor currencyand time deposits.
We also assunie that the termsl lal and aC/aT are constant. Different
assumptions for these terms can be introduced without changingthe
argument.
In Figure 1, QA and C) ti' are the optiniuni quantities of timecleposi ts
and currency. OL and O'E' are the actual quantities, given (iT ± r) >0.
Therefore, the original welfare lossis given by the triangles AVE and
AD 'E'.
Now let indexation be introduced a step at a time on timedeposits. Let
the first of these steps be equal to CF. Holdings of time depositsincrease
by LH, while holdings of currency fall by E'E". Social welfare increasesby
EHGI) minus E'E"D"D'. 'Ne can repeat the exercise and increaseindexa-
tion by Fl (=DF). Time deposit holdings increase byHK (=EH) and
currency holdings decrease by F"!)" '=E'E"). But while the area
0" '0" is equal to E'E"D"D' (that is, the loss increases at a constantrate for
each percentage pointininclexation), the sacial gain increases at a
declining rate (in this case, by HKJC < EHGD). Therefore, thereis one rate
of indexation at which the positive contribution to welfareexactly equals
the negative contribution, and this is the optimum rate ofindexation.
Therefore, since the private cost of holding currencyand demand
deposits exceeds the cost of producing these moneys,decreasing the















But T= (w-Fry)* and Tkir ± r.Therefore
iir + r)
a